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Abstract
A discrete time model of a nancial market is proposed, where the
time evolution of asset prices and wealth arises from the interaction
of two groups of agents, fundamentalists and chartists. Each group
allocates its wealth between a risky asset (stock) and an alternative
asset (bond), and the two groups have heterogeneous expectations
about returns. We assume that chartists compute expected returns
by extrapolating past price changes, while fundamentalists form their
expectations on the basis of their superior knowledge of fundamentals.
Under the assumption that agents have CRRA utility, investors' opti-
mal demand for each asset depends on their wealth, and this results in
growing price and wealth processes. The time evolution of the prices
is modeled by assuming the existence of a market maker, who sets ex-
cess demand of each asset to zero at the end of each trading period
by taking an o-setting long or short position. The market maker is
assumed to adjust the price, in each period, partly on the basis of
the excess demand and partly according to a particular market stabi-
lization policy. The model is reduced to a high dimensional nonlinear
discrete-time dynamical system with growing prices and wealth. Al-
though the model is nonstationary, suitable changes of variables lead
to a stationary model where the dynamic variables are actual and ex-
pected returns, fundamental/price ratios, and wealth proportions of
1chartists and fundamentalists. The steady states and other invariant
sets of the model are determined, and important global dynamic phe-
nomena are studied via numerical techniques. Stochastic simulations
are also performed, that show the ability of the model to generate some
of the characteristic features of nancial time series.
1 Introduction
In recent years several models of asset price dynamics based on the inter-
action of heterogeneous agents have been proposed (Day and Huang (1990),
Brock and Hommes (1998), Lux (1998), Chen and Yeh (1997), Gauners-
dorfer (2000), Chiarella and He (2001, 2002a,b), Fernandez-Rodriguez et
al. (2002)). Most of these models, some of which allow the size of the dif-
ferent groups of agents to vary according to the evolution of the nancial
market, are of necessity not very mathematically tractable. In a previous
paper, Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2002), whose antecedents are Chiarella
(1992), Beja and Goldman (1980), and Zeeman (1974), we developed a two-
dimensional discrete time model of asset price dynamics containing the es-
sential elements of the heterogeneous agents paradigm whilst still remaining
mathematically tractable. In that model we assumed a nancial market
with a risky asset and an alternative riskless asset, consisting of two types
of traders: fundamentalists, holding a superior knowledge of fundamentals,
and chartists, basing their trading decisions on an analysis of past price
trends. However, the model studied in Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2002)
is a partial one since it leaves in the background the dynamics of the market
for the alternative asset. This results in the equilibrium not being at the
fundamental value of the risky asset. Moreover, in that model agents' opti-
mal demands for the risky asset are independent of their wealth, as a result
of the underlying CARA utility functions, and therefore the time evolution
of agents' wealth has no eect on price dynamics.
In the present paper, again assuming a nancial market consisting of
fundamentalists and chartists, we develop a more complete model where the
dynamics of the price of the alternative asset, and its dependence on agents'
investment decisions, is also taken into account. This avoids the unintuitive
steady state of the earlier model. Moreover, we consider a more realistic
framework where investors' optimal decisions depend on their wealth (as
a result of underlying CRRA utility functions) and both price and wealth
processes are thus growing. Each group forms expectations about asset
returns and allocates its wealth between the risky asset and the alternative
asset. The time evolution of the prices is modelled by assuming the existence
2of a market maker, who sets excess demand to zero at the end of each trading
period by taking an o-setting long or short position. The market maker
also decides the next period prices partly on the basis of the excess demand
(because of inventory reasons) and partly in order to steer prices back to
their equilibrium (fundamental) values (to ensure an \orderly" adjustment
of prices).
The model is reduced to a high-dimensional nonlinear discrete-time dy-
namical system that describes the time evolution of actual returns, agents'
beliefs about expected returns, fundamental/price ratios and wealth propor-
tions of the two groups. Despite the high dimension of the model, analytical
results can be obtained in some particular lower-dimensional cases, and these
help to understand the global dynamic behaviour of the dynamical system.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives the asset de-
mand functions for each asset by each investor type. Section 3 describes how
demands are aggregated by the market maker via a price adjustment rule
in the market for each asset. Section 4 describes the resulting dynamical
system for the time evolution of actual and expected returns, fundamen-
tal/price ratios and wealth proportions. Section 5 focuses on the equilibria
of the model, outlining some results about their local asymptotic stability,
and analyzes the restriction of the dynamics of the model to some important
invariant subsets of the phase-space. Using numerical and graphical tools,
Section 6 performs some global analysis of the out-of-equilibrium dynam-
ics of the model, focusing on phenomena of regular or chaotic oscillatory
dynamics, intermittent behaviour, and coexistence of attracting sets in the
phase space. Section 7 performs some stochastic simulations in order to show
how the interaction of the nonlinear deterministic phenomena of the model
with simple noise processes can give rise to some of the typical distributional
features of asset returns.
2 Asset demand and expectation formation
We label with 1 the risky asset (stock) and with 2 the alternative asset
(bond). For i = 1;2 we denote by Pi;t the price of the i-th asset at time
t, by gi the dividend (or coupon) yield, assumed constant, produced by
the i-th asset from t to t + 1; we use the subscript j 2 ff;cg to denote
fundamentalists or chartists. In each time period each group of agents is
assumed to invest some of its wealth in the risky asset and some in the risk-





i;t the wealth of agent j and the fraction






























+ g2) , (1)
where (Pi;t+1   Pi;t)=Pi;t is the capital gain on the i-th asset over (t;t + 1).
We denote by E
(j)
t , V ar
(j)
t the \beliefs" of investor type j, at time t,
about conditional expectation and variance, respectively. It is assumed that
all the investors have the same attitude to risk with the same CRRA utility
of wealth function1 u(
) = log(
). Agent j seeks the fractions Z
(j)
i;t , i = 1;2,





t+1)], the expected utility of wealth at time t+1.




















agent j's conditional expectation and variance of the capital gain on the
ith asset, respectively. As shown in the Appendix2, under some not very

























2;t = 1   Z
(j)
1;t . (2)
The two groups of agents dier in the way they update their expectations
over successive time intervals.
We assume that chartists follow the trend, so that their conditional ex-
pectations m
(c)
i;t , i = 1;2, evolve over time according to the adaptive rule
m
(c)








1The analysis can be generalized to the case where the utility functions are dierent for




j   1)= j , 0 < j < 1.
2See also Chiarella and He (2001).
4where 0  ci  1. On the other hand we assume that the fundamental-
ists, with their superior knowledge of the economy, are able to estimate the
fundamental price of each asset at time t (Yi;t, i = 1;2) as the discounted
present value of expected future payments. We also assume that they be-
lieve in a return to the fundamental price, so that their expectation of the
capital gain on asset i over (t;t+1) includes a time-varying short-run com-
ponent i(Yi;t  Pi;t)=Pi;t, 0  i  1, which is proportional to the (relative)
deviation of the actual price Pi;t from the fundamental Yi;t, and a constant
component  i, that reects fundamentalists' expectation about the growth
rate of the fundamental in the long-run. Therefore the fundamentalist ex-
pected (relative) price change of the i-th asset may be written as
m
(f)






2;t = 1(Y1;t=P1;t   1)   2(Y2;t=P2;t   1) +  ,
where  =  1    2 represents the dierence between the expected growth
rates of the fundamentals.
3 Price setting rules
We assume the existence of a market maker, who is suciently \rational"
to know the fundamental prices at time t as well as their growth rates
over the next period (denote them by i;t+1, i = 1;2). We assume that
he/she also knows the wealth fractions that \in equilibrium" each type of
agents will invest in each asset (denote them by e Z
(f)
1 ; e Z
(c)
1 ; e Z
(f)





2 = 1   e Z
(j)
1 , j 2 ff;cg)3. The market maker sets the excess demand
of each asset to zero at the end of each trading period, by taking an o-
setting long or short position, and adjusts the prices partly according to the
out-of-equilibrium demand, and partly in order to steer the prices back to
their fundamental values. The above assumptions about the market maker's
behavior are expressed by the following price setting rule in the i-th market:








i;t   e Z
(f)

















3We could for instance think of the market maker using his/her knowledge of the time
series of the order ow from the two groups of market participants to estimate these
fractions as a long-run average.
5where i > 0, 0 < i < 1 and i = 1;2. The price setting rule (3) can
be interpreted in the sense that the market maker varies the price from
period to period so as to adjust his/her inventory of the asset by raising the
price when excess demand reduces the inventory and by lowering the price
when excess supply determines inventory accumulation; at the same time,
the market maker corrects his/her response so as to bring about \orderly"
price movements in the market, this being one of the other assumed roles of
the market maker4. In equation (3), the rst term on the right hand side
describes the market maker's policy that seeks to steer the price of the i-th
asset back to fundamental price Yi;t (with adjustment coecient i). The
second term on the right hand side of (3) species the price change due to the
underlying trend in the fundamental, assumed to be known to the market
maker: this term represents the \equilibrium" portion of the price change.
The third term on the right hand side is the portion of the price change
depending on agents' demand at time t: consistent with our assumptions
about the market maker's behaviour, this latter term is proportional to the
out-of equilibrium demand for the ith asset5. The coecient i represents
the market maker's speed of adjustment of the ith price. Notice that in the
absence of price adjustments due to the excess demand (i ! 0), the price
setting rule (3) results in the dierence equation:
Pi;t+1 = Pi;t + i(Yi;t   Pi;t) + i;t+1Yi;t
whose solution is
Pi;t = Yi;t + (Pi;0   Yi;0)(1   i)t
with limt!1 Pi;t = Yi;t, which means price converging from above or below
to fundamental value according to the sign of the initial deviation (Pi;0 Yi;0).
4In order to focus on the dynamics resulting from agents' interaction, the role played
by the market maker in this model is highly stylised. The literature on the market maker
behaviour suggests that he/she may play a more complex role in price formation, being not
only a dealer who adjusts the quoted prices, but also an active investor (see, for instance,
Madhavan and Smidt, 1993 and Madhavan, 2000).
5Since in this model agents' wealth, and therefore average demand for each asset, are
growing over time, in eq. (3) we normalize the out-of-equilibrium demand, dividing it by








64 The dynamical system
The dynamics of the model derived in the previous sections can be summa-
rized as







i;t   e Z
(f)

















+i(Yi;t   Pi;t) + i;t+1Yi;t; (i = 1;2)
m
(c)
























































2 = 1   e Z
(j)
1 , j 2 ff;cg.
For the moment we do not specify the way in which agents update their
beliefs about the conditional variance in eqs. (5) and (6). In order to avoid
adding more dynamic equations to the model, we assume that agent type j
calculates V
(j)
1;t as a function of the state of the system at time t, in particular
we assume that V
(j)





On the other hand, the specication of such a function is only needed in
order to perform numerical simulations, but it is not required in order to
transform the model into a stationary system and to analyse its general
properties (see the following subsections).
6This general assumption includes the case where the conditional variance V
(j)
1;t is con-
stant, or the more realistic case where it varies over time together with the size of the






2;t) + (g1   g2)
 
 .
74.1 The stationary model
In this model both prices and wealth processes are growing, due to the un-
derlying growth of the fundamentals in each market and due to the fact that
the optimal demand for each asset depends on agents' wealth. A stationary
system can be obtained by formulating the model in terms of returns and








































t are the wealth proportions of fundamentalists and
chartists at time t, respectively, yi;t is the ratio between the fundamen-
tal value and the price of the i-th asset, i;t+1 is the capital gain on the i-th
asset over (t;t + 1), and therefore (i;t+1 + gi) represents the return on the







t the total wealth at
time t, and by !
(j)
t+1, j 2 ff;cg, the growth rate of the wealth of agent type















= (1   Z
(j)
1;t)(2;t+1 + g2) + Z
(j)
1;t(1;t+1 + g1) . (7)
Using the foregoing changes of variables, equations (4) may be rewritten in
terms of total wealth, wealth proportions of the two groups, and rates of
























Summing up the last two equations, and recalling that w
(c)




7Similar changes of variables for prices and wealth are used, in order to get a stationary
model of asset price dynamics, by Chiarella and He (2001). An evolutionary model of a
nancial market formulated in terms of wealth shares of the market participants is also













Substituting into the rst equation of (8), the law governing the time evolu-












t (1 + !
(f)
t+1) + (1   w
(f)





















t+1 = (1   w
(f)
t+1).
As far as the time evolution of the fundamental prices Yi;t is concerned,
we assume that their growth rates (assumed to be known to the market
maker) are constant over time, i;t+1 = i , i = 1;2. It follows that the




yi;t; i = 1;2 .




1;t and e Z
(j)
2 = 1  e Z
(j)
1 , j 2 ff;cg, we obtain





1;t   e Z
(f)




1;t   e Z
(c)
1 )] +











































t (1 + !
(f)
t+1) + (1   w
(f)










1;t are given by (7), (5) and (6), respec-
tively.
From our assumptions about the market maker's price setting rules it
follows that when prices and agents' investment fractions are at their equi-
librium levels (yi;t = 1, i = 1;2, Z
(j)
1;t = e Z
(j)
1 , j 2 ff;cg), then the actual
returns and the chartists' expected returns are equal to the rates of growth
of the fundamentals; i.e. i;t = m
(c)
i;t = i, i = 1;2. As a consequence, the



















2 = 1   e Z
(j)
1 , j 2 ff;cg (e V
(j)
1 represents the belief of investor type j
about the conditional variance of the risky return in equilibrium). Eqs. (12)
and (13) state that the equilibrium investment fraction in the risky asset is
given by the expected equilibrium risk-adjusted excess return, as one would
expect.
4.2 The map
As we are assuming that agent j calculates V
(j)





2;t, it follows that we can represent the fundamentalist
conditional variance and the fundamentalist optimal investment fractions as
functions of the state variables y1 and y2 according to
V
(f)
1;t = v(f)(y1;t;y2;t) ,
Z
(f)
1;t = (f)(y1;t;y2;t) =
1(y1;t   1) +    2(y2;t   1) + (g1   g2)
v(f)(y1;t;y2;t)
.
Analogously, we can represent the chartist conditional variance and the































10In this notation the equilibrium fractions (12) and (13) would be given by
e Z
(f)
1 = (f)(1;1) and e Z
(c)
1 = (c)(1;2), respectively.
To summarize, by denoting with the symbol 0 the unit time advancement
operator8, the time evolution of the model is given by the iteration of the
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1   e Z
(f)
1 ) + (1   w(f))(Z
(c)
1   e Z
(c)
1 )] + 1(y1   1) + 1y1;
0

























































1  (f)(y1;y2) =























1 = (f)(1;1), e Z
(c)
1 = (c)(1;2)9.
5 Invariant subsets of the phase space and funda-
mental equilibria
In this section we focus on some general properties of the map (14), that can
help us to understand the dynamic behaviour of the system. An important
8i.e. if x is the value of a state variable at time t, then x
0 denotes the value of the same
variable at time (t + 1).




2 do not depend





(f), so the dynamic variables 1 and 2
could be eliminated by substitution, thus giving a 5-dimensional system. However in this
case we would obtain very complicated analytical expressions for the remaining dynamic
equations, and since the state variables 1 and 2 are the ones on which we focus our
attention, we analyse the dynamic model in the form (14).
11feature of the map is the existence of a one-dimensional invariant subset
of the phase space, associated with the \fundamental" levels of the state
variables i, m
(c)
i , yi, i = 1;2. In fact, assume that such variables are at
their equilibrium levels, i.e. 1 = m
(c)
1 = 1, 2 = m
(c)
2 = 2, y1 = y2 = 1.
Then it is easy to check that such variables do not vary under iteration by
the map T, i.e.
T(1;2;1;1;1;2;w(f)) = (1;2;1;1;1;2;w(f)0) ,
which means that the dynamics of the system are constrained in a one-
dimensional subset of the phase space (let us denote it by E). The subset
E of the phase space is invariant, and along such an invariant manifold the
time evolution of the system is obtained by iteration of a one-dimensional
nonlinear map governing the dynamics of the wealth fractions, say T (w) :
w(f) 7 ! w(f)0, given by
w(f)0 =
w(f)(1 + e !(f))
1 + e !(c) + w(f)(e !(f)   e !(c))
, (15)
where
e !(f) = (1   e Z
(f)
1 )(2 + g2) + e Z
(f)
1 (1 + g1) ,
e !(c) = (1   e Z
(c)
1 )(2 + g2) + e Z
(c)
1 (1 + g1);
are the rates of growth of the wealth of fundamentalists and chartists along
the invariant manifold. Notice that, apart from the particular case where
e Z
(f)
1 = e Z
(c)
1 , and thus e !(f) = e !(c), the one-dimensional map (15) admits two
xed points, w(f) = 1 and w(f) = 010. We can conclude that the system has
at least two steady states (let us denote them by fundamental steady states,
F and C), both lying in the invariant subset E, that are characterized by
\fundamental" equilibrium levels of the state variables
1 = m
(c)
1 = 1 , 2 = m
(c)
2 = 2 , y1 = y2 = 1 ,
10In the particular case where e Z
(f)
1 = e Z
(c)
1 any value w
(f), 0  w
(f)  1 is an equilibrium
value for the state variable w
(f). In the general case where e Z
(f)
1 6= e Z
(c)
1 , the convergence of
the system to either one or the other of the two equilibria depends on the relation between
e !
(f) and e !
(c), i.e. between the equilibrium investment fractions e Z
(f)
1 and e Z
(c)
1 . Assume,
in particular, 1 + g1 > 2 + g2: in the case e Z
(f)
1 > e Z
(c)
1 , i.e. e !
(f) > e !
(c)(fundamentalists
are investing more than chartists in the asset with higher return in equilibrium), w
(f) = 0
is unstable and w
(f) = 1 is a (globally) stable equilibrium (chartists disappear in the long
run), while in the opposite case, e Z
(f)
1 < e Z
(c)
1 , i.e. e !
(f) < e !
(c), w
(f) = 1 is unstable and
w
(f) = 0 is a (globally) attracting equilibrium (fundamentalists disappear in the long-run).
12and by equilibrium wealth proportions w(f) = 1 or w(f) = 0, where only
fundamentalists or, respectively, chartists survive in the market. Of course
such situations cannot be considered as true equilibrium situations; they are
a result of the fact that our dynamic model does not consider the possible
time evolution of the size of the two groups according, e.g., to the realized
prots. On the other hand, numerical simulations show that if optimal
agents' investment fractions in equilibrium e Z
(f)
1 and e Z
(c)
1 are not too dierent
from each other, then the wealth dynamics along the invariant manifold E is
very slow. It seems more important to analyse the conditions (values of the
parameters and initial state of the system) under which, either the system
converges to the the invariant subset E (with prices and returns settling
down on their \fundamental" levels), or it converges to other attracting sets
characterized by uctuations in prices, returns and wealth fractions. This
is what we will do in the next section through numerical simulations.
Other invariant subsets of the phase space are those associated with the
cases w(f) = 1 (where only fundamentalists operate in the market) and
w(f) = 0 (only chartists operate in the market). Notice that in both cases
the dynamics of the system are obtained by iteration of a 6-dimensional





2 are not meaningful (and do not feed back into the system)
and thus the dynamics are obtained by iteration of a 4-dimensional map.
Particularly interesting is the case w(f) = 0. The 6-dimensional map,
say T(c) driving the system in this case is given by
T(c) :
8
> > > > > > > > > <




1   e Z
(c)
1 ) + 1(y1   1) + 1y1;
0




























Numerical simulations show that the fundamental steady state 1 = m
(c)
1 =
1, 2 = m
(c)
2 = 2, y1 = y2 = 1, is locally asymptotically stable for su-
ciently low values of the chartists adjustment parameters c1 and c2, and of
the speeds of adjustment of market prices 1 and 2, while for higher values
of these adjustment parameters the equilibrium becomes unstable and tra-
jectories converge to an attracting limit cycle, with persistent uctuations
around the fundamental equilibrium. The results of these numerical experi-
ments are given in the next section, where it is also shown how the study of
13the dynamics of the system in the limiting case w(f) = 0 is a good starting
point to understand the dynamic behaviour of the full system.
6 Out-of-equilibrium dynamics and coexistence of
attracting sets
Throughout the present section, we analyse numerically some global dy-
namic phenomena of the system; these include \non fundamental" equilib-
ria, oscillatory dynamics (regular of chaotic), and coexistence of attracting
sets in the phase space. In order to perform the numerical simulations, we
specify the analytical form of the fundamentalist and chartist investment
fractions Z
(f)






2 ). Similarly to the ba-
sic model developed in Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2002), we assume that





1 ), so that the fundamentalist optimal investment pro-
portion in asset 1 is a linear function of the deviations from fundamentals:-
(f)(y1;y2) = a1(y1   1)   a2(y2   1) + b ,
where ai = i=v
(f)
1 , i = 1;2, and b = ( + g1   g2)=v
(f)
1 . Unlike the fun-
damentalists, the chartists are assumed to change their estimate V
(c)
1 of









. As this quantity becomes larger they expect greater
volatility and increase their estimate V
(c)
1 , so that the optimal investment
proportion in asset 1 results in a nonlinear S-shaped increasing function of














arctan(x) , (; > 0) .
Fig. 1 displays the shape of the function h(x) with dierent values of the
parameters , 11.
11The parameter  = h
0(0) governs the slope of the chartist demand function (strength
of chartist demand) for x = 0, and the coecient 1= can be interpreted as the estimate
of the variance in the case of zero expected excess return. The parameters  and  jointly
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Figure 1: chartist demand function.
156.1 Non fundamental equilibria
Depending on the parameters that characterize the agents' demand func-
tions, the map T may admit further xed points (besides the fundamental
steady states F and C), characterized by price/fundamental ratios tend-
ing to innity, i.e. by y1 = 0 or y2 = 0. As an example, with the de-
mand functions assumed above, it is easy to check that the point y1 = 0,
2 = m
(c)
2 = 2, w(f) = 0, 1 =m
(c)




farctan[(1   2 + g1   g2)]   arctan[(1   2 + g1   g2)]g
and




is an equilibrium point for the dynamical system. Fig. 2 represents the
projection, in the plane of the state variables 1, y1, of a trajectory con-
verging to such a non fundamental solution, where the price of the risky
asset grows at the rate 1 = 1 ' 0:21079 (higher than the rate of growth
of the fundamental value 1 = 0:02), and the fundamental/price ratios are
y1 = 0, y2 = y2' 1:03389. In such an example, although the initial values
of the state variables are taken very close to the fundamental levels, and
agents adjust their expectations weakly, the price of the risky asset increas-
ingly deviates from the fundamental value (y1 ! 0) due to the high speed
of reaction of the price to the excess demand (high value of 1). Further
numerical simulations show that the possibility that the system converges to
such equilibria is ruled out provided that the reaction parameters of market













1= 0.02    r2= m(c)
2 = 0.018









1= 0.21079    r2= m(c)
2 = 0.018
y1= 0  y2= 1.03389    w(f)= 0 
F f1= 0.02    f2= 0.018
g1= g2= 0
h1 = h2 = 0.02
d= 0.002  v1
(f)= 0.008
g = 200   q = 100
c1= c2= 0.1
b1= 0.25  b2= 0.006
a1= a2= 0.45
Figure 2: convergence to a non fundamental equilibrium.
6.2 Steady state bifurcations and attracting limit cycles
For particular parameter values, the long-run evolution of the system may
be characterized by stable oscillations along a limit cycle, where prices and
returns uctuate around their fundamental levels. Let us rst illustrate such
phenomenon in the subcase w(f) = 0, where only chartists operate in the
market and therefore, as stressed in the previous section, the time evolution
of the system is obtained by iteration of the lower-dimensional map T (c)
given by (16). Fig. 3a shows the projection, in the plane of the state
variables 1, y1, of a trajectory converging with damped oscillations to the
\fundamental equilibrium", which is an attracting focus12. By increasing
the values of the adjustment parameters c1, c2, 1 and 2, with respect to
the ones used in Fig. 3a, the fundamental equilibrium becomes a repelling
12The fact that the system may converge to the fundamental steady state, although
only chartists survive in the market, is due to the assumed stabilizing role of the market
maker.
17focus and trajectories converge to an attracting limit cycle, existing around
the equilibrium. We have found numerical evidence that the creation of such
a limit cycle occurs through a supercritical Neimark-Hopf bifurcation. Figs.
3b and 3c show the attracting invariant closed curve existing for increased
values of the parameters c1 and, respectively, 1 starting from the stable
case represented in Fig.3a.
Fig. 3
f1= 0.02    f2= 0.018
g1= g2= 0
h1 = h2 = 0.05
d= 0.002   v1
(f)=0.005









c1 = c2 = 0.1








c1= 0.3   c2= 0.1










b1= 0.02   b2= 0.005
Figure 3: market dominated by chartists;
(a) low values of the adjustment parameters: convergence to the \funda-
mental" equilibrium;
(b) higher value of the chartist adjustment parameter;
(c) higher speed of adjustment of market price: convergence to a limit
cycle around the fundamental equilibrium.
18As outlined in the previous section, the lower dimensional system ob-
tained in the case w(f) = 0 is a good starting point from which to under-
stand the dynamic behaviour of the full system. In fact, the attracting limit
cycle of the lower dimensional map (16) may also be reached by trajectories
starting with positive initial fundamentalist wealth fraction w
(f)
0 . In Fig.
4 we take parameter values similar to the ones used in Fig. 3a. Fig. 4a
shows a case with high initial proportion of chartist wealth, w
(f)
0 = 0:1;
the trajectory converges to the attracting limit cycle in the 6-dimensional
invariant subset w(f) = 0. On the contrary, Fig. 4b shows a trajectory with
high initial proportion of fundamentalist wealth, w
(f)
0 = 0:9, converging to
the \fundamental" invariant set E (with fundamentalist wealth fraction con-
verging to w(f) = 1). This is a phenomenon of coexistence of an attracting
equilibrium and an attracting limit cycle. Of course, in the case of coex-
istence of attracting sets the numerical study of the basins of attraction
becomes crucial, with particular attention to the eect, on the dynamic out-
come of the system, of the initial wealth proportion of the two groups and
of the initial deviation of the prices from the fundamentals.
Other global dynamic phenomena, in particular new cases of coexistence
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(a) high initial proportion of chartists' wealth: convergence to a limit cycle
around the fundamental equilibrium;
(b) high initial proportion of fundamentalists' wealth: convergence to the
fundamental equilibrium.
206.3 Global dynamics and bifurcations
In this section we focus on some important global phenomena, such as the
creation of new attractors, characterized by regular or chaotic oscillations,
and the eect on their structure of changes of the key parameters of the
model. Although the numerical examples of this section are obtained with
particular values of the parameters, the phenomena that we describe are
persistent and can be easily observed in several parameter regimes.
The rst phenomenon we consider concerns the existence of a new at-
tracting limit cycle (dierent from the one that may exist in the invariant
subset w(f) = 0), characterized by long-run uctuations of the wealth pro-
portions of fundamentalists and chartists, as well as of the other remaining
variables. The creation of such an attracting closed curve is in general due
to a global bifurcation, i.e. it is not related to the eigenvalues of the Jaco-
bian matrix of T evaluated at the equilibria F and C. An example of an
attracting limit cycle of this kind is represented in Fig. 5a. Along the limit
cycle both groups of agents survive in the long-run, with wealth proportions
uctuating around average values. Let us now analyse the eect of the key
parameters characterizing the chartist behaviour, namely the chartist de-
mand parameter  and the adjustment parameters c1 and c2. Figs. 5b and
5c represent the eect on the limit cycle of increasing the parameter , that
governs the slope of the chartist demand function. Looking at the projection
of the attractor in the (1, y1) plane, we observe a transition from regular
to chaotic uctuations and an increasing average wealth proportion of fun-
damentalists as long as the uctuations become chaotic. The latter eect is
probably due to the fact that the adaptive rule used by chartists to forecast
asset returns is more succesful in the case of regular, rather than erratic,
uctuations. A similar eect on the nature of the cyclic attractor and on
the average wealth proportions in the long-run is obtained if we increase the
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c1= c2 = 0.45 c1= c2 = 0.6
w(f)=0.49 on average w(f)=0.56 on average
w(f)=0.59 on average w(f)=0.7 on average
Figure 5:
(a) prices, returns and wealth shares uctuate on a limit cycle;
(b),(c) eect of increasing the strength of chartists demand ;
(d),(e) eect of increasing the chartist adjustment parameters c1 and c2.
22Of course such an attractor may coexist with other possible asymptotic
behaviours of the system. As an example, with the slightly dierent pa-
rameter set of Fig. 6 an attracting limit cycle characterized by long-run
uctuations of prices, returns and wealth proportions, coexists in the phase
space with the attracting \fundamental" invariant set E, where prices and
returns settle down at their \fundamental" levels. The initial condition is
the same in Fig. 6a and in Fig. 6b, except for the initial wealth proportion
of fundamentalists (w
(f)
0 = 0:375 in Fig. 6a, w
(f)
0 = 0:3 in Fig. 6b). The
system converges to the limit cycle only for a suciently low initial wealth
proportion of the fundamentalists.
A second dynamic phenomenon that is worth considering is the exis-
tence of asymptotic behaviors where the system may switch between dif-
ferent regimes characterized by uctuations of dierent amplitude. Such
phenomenon may consist in a regular switching between phases of periodic
uctuations of dierent size, as in the case represented in Figs. 7a,b, or in
chaotic behaviour characterized by phases of almost periodic uctuations
irregularly interrupted by sudden \bursts" of erratic uctuations (intermit-
tency), as in the case represented in Figs. 7c,d. It may also happen that
such bursts characterize only the transient part of the trajectory, before the
system settles down on an attractor with uctuations of almost constant
amplitude (as in the case of Figs. 7e,f, obtained with small changes in the
parameters of Figs. 7c,d).
As shown in the next section, the interaction between the deterministic
nonlinear dynamic phenomena of this model and simple exogenous stochastic
factors may generate the characteristic features of nancial time series, such
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Figure 6: dynamic variables converging to their fundamental levels;
(a) or uctuating around the fundamental levels;
(b) according to the initial proportion of fundamentalists' wealth.
24f1= 0.01    f2= 0.008   g1= 0.0025   g2= 0.002
h1 = h2 = 0.4   d=0.002    v1
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Figure 7: cases of intermittent behavior;
(a),(b) periodic switching to phases of large uctuations;
(c),(d) chaotic \bursts";
(e),(f) intermittency in the transient part of a trajectory.
257 Stochastic simulations
It is of interest to see how the dynamic features of the nonlinear heteroge-
neous agents' model established in this paper are aected by simple noise
processes. The aim of this section is to show that such an interaction may
generate some of the basic characteristics of time series of returns in nan-
cial markets such as fat tails, skewness, peaked distributions and volatility
clustering.
In our examples, stochastic factors are considered by adding a normally
distributed noise in the dierence equation for the dynamic variable m
(c)
1;t,
so that the chartist expected return on the risky asset between t and t + 1
would be given by
m
(c)
1;t = (1   c1)m
(c)
1;t 1 + c11;t + t ,
where the t are i.i.d. normally distributed random variables with zero
mean. This captures the notion that chartists adjust their estimate of the
risky return over the next period according to randomly arriving good or
bad news in the market. The dynamic equation for m
(c)
1 of the map (14)
would thus be rewritten as:
m
(c)0
1 = (1   c1)m
(c)
1 + c10
1 +    N(0;2).
Figs. 8a,b display the time series of returns on asset 1 and the re-
turn distribution (compared with the corresponding normal distribution)
resulting from a simulation of (14) with a normally distributed noise with
 = 0:0006124. The parameters are the one relevant for the chaotic regime
illustrated in Fig. 5b. The stochastic version of the model is able to generate
fat tails, skewness and kurtosis.
Fig. 8c,d display the time series of returns and the return distribution
obtained adding a normally distributed noise ( = 0:0006532) to the deter-
ministic situation of intermittency shown in Figs. 7c,d. Again the stochas-
tic model clearly shows the distributional characteristics of real nancial
data. Similar features are present in 8e,f ( = 0:0002041), associated to
the deterministic trajectories represented in Figs. 7e,f. In particular, the
phenomenon of volatility clustering observed in the latter cases is related to
the underlying deterministic switching between phases with uctuations of
dierent amplitude.
Similar features, in particular volatility clustering, may be obtained in
the cases of coexistence of attracting sets (as the one already illustrated in
26the previous section), by allowing exogenous stochastic shocks to move the
phase-point between the basins of the coexisting asymptotic states.
It is worth noting how such distributional characteristics do not appear
if we allow normal random disturbances when the deterministic dynamics
exhibit a monotonic convergence to steady state, as in the case of Fig. 9
( = 0:001306). In this case the distribution of the capital gain 1 is ap-
proximately normal.
Of course such simulations are not expected to mimic the real data,
but they have been chosen to illustrate qualitatively how non normally dis-
tributed returns similar to the ones observed in nancial markets may be
the result of the interaction of nonlinear deterministic dynamic phenomena,
such as chaotic uctuations, intermittency or coexistence of attracting sets,
























(a),(b) stochastic time series and distribution of the capital gain 1 in the case
of convergence to a chaotic attractor;
(c),(d) and (e),(f) stochastic time series and distribution of 1 in the case of irregular
chaotic bursts.
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(b),(c) stochastic time series and distribution of the capital gain 1 in a case
where the dynamic variables converge monotonically to their funda-
mental levels.
298 Conclusions
In the present paper we have set up a model of heterogenous agents (fun-
damentalists and chartists) investing in a portfolio of a risky asset and a
risk-free asset. Each group forms expectations about asset returns and al-
locates its wealth between the two assets according to one-period expected
utility maximization. The investors dier with respect to their \beliefs"
about the conditional expected returns of the two assets and the variance
of the risky return. Market clearing is eected by a market maker whose
price adjustment rules take account of agents' excess demand but also seek to
maintain asset prices close to their exogenously determined fundamental val-
ues in the long-run. Due to the assumed CRRA utility functions, investors'
optimal decisions depend on their wealth and this results in growing prices
and wealth.
We set up the high-dimensional dynamical system arising from the in-
teraction and dynamic updating of beliefs of the various agents across the
markets for the two assets, and we reduce it to a stationary system where the
dynamic variables are actual and expected returns, ratios between funda-
mental values and prices, and wealth proportions of the two groups of agents.
Using both analytical and numerical techniques, we are able to characterize
the steady states of the model in this case, as well as other invariant sets on
which the dynamics are described by lower dimensional maps.
We then focus on the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of the model: here
analytical results seem dicult, so that we mainly use numerical simula-
tions to study the out-of-equilibrium behavior. The main characteristics
are phenomena of coexistence of attracting sets, phenomena of intermittent
behaviour as well as other phenomena of chaotic dynamics: these latter
phenomena seem to emerge mainly when the chartists' demand function is
suciently sloped or when they update suciently fast their expectations.
Stochastic simulations are also performed in order to show how the interac-
tion of the nonlinear dynamic phenomena of this model with simple noise
processes can give rise to the qualitative types of behaviour observed in real
nancial data.
It still remains to undertake a more thorough numerical study of the
eect of changes of key parameters of the model, such as the ones character-
izing the agents' demand functions and the market maker's price adjustment
rule parameters, as well as the impact of exogenous stochastic factors. This
kind of analysis will require an interplay among theoretical and numerical
methods, which is typical for the study of the global dynamic properties of
nonlinear dynamical systems of dimension greater than one, as stressed in
30Mira et al. (1996) and Brock and Hommes (1997).
Appendix
One period intertemporal optimization with two assets
The expected utility maximization problem faced by agent j at time t is





The time evolution of the utility of wealth U(
) is modelled by assuming









where zi, i = 1;2, are standard uncorrelated Wiener processes. Then from
Ito's lemma the utility of wealth X = U(
) evolves according to the contin-
uous time stochastic dierential equation













i(X;t) = U0(U 1(X))bi(U 1(X);t); i = 1;2;
and 
 = U 1(X) is the inverse function of the utility of wealth.
Using the Euler-Maruyama discretization one obtains the following discrete-













31with zi;t  N(0;t), i = 1;2. In particular, from (21) one obtains
Et[Xt+t] = Xt + t(Xt)t . (22)
Rescaling the time unit, equation (22) becomes:

























where the "i;t, i = 1;2, are N(0;1) processes.
In order to specify the coecients at(
t) and bt(
t) in a way consistent
with our model, we recall that, from eq. (4) the time evolution of wealth of




tZ1;t(1;t+1 + g1) + 
t(1   Z1;t)(2;t+1 + g2) . (25)
Denoting by mi;t and Vi;t the belief of agent j at time t about expectation
and variance of i;t+1, i = 1;2, we assume that
i;t+1 = mi;t +
p
Vi;t "i;t i = 1;2
where "1;t and "2;t are N(0;1) processes, with Et("1;t "2;t) = 0. Substituting












It follows that the coecients at(
t) and bi;t(
t), i = 1;2, in eq. (24) can
be consistently specied as
at(
t) = 










32and thus the expected utility of wealth Et[U(













1;tV1;t + (1   Z1;t)2V2;t] .



















(m1;t + g1)   (m2;t + g2) + V2;t
V1;t + V2;t
. (27)
Throughout this paper we assume that asset 2 (a bond) is a \safe" asset
in agents' beliefs (i.e., we take V
(j)
2;t = 0, j 2 (f;c)), although we allow agents
to adjust over time their estimate of the conditional expected return m
(j)
2;t.
In this case eq. (27) reduces to the form
Z1;t =
(m1;t + g1)   (m2;t + g2)
V1;t
; (28)
which is the one we use. We may also consider eq. (28) as an approximation
of the optimal investment rule (27) for the case where V2;t is strictly positive
but suciently small as compared with V1;t.
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